Six Centuries of Global History and a Lesson for 21st Century India (ICC Blog # 114)
- Dr Sp Mishra
- Aug 31
- 6 min read
For more than six hundred years, world history has unfolded as a relay race of power. Rarely has a single country remained dominant for long. Instead, influence shifted from one centre of gravity to another, with each new power rising not by copying its predecessor but by leaning into its own unique strengths.
The Portuguese and Spanish of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries commanded the seas with their mastery of navigation, shipbuilding, and daring exploration. They did not industrialise or build great financial centres; instead, their advantage was maritime technology, which allowed them to knit together a global empire across oceans. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch built their dominance not on colonies but on finance. They created the first stock exchange, perfected the joint-stock company, and made Amsterdam the financial capital of the world. Britain rose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by embracing the Industrial Revolution. The workshop of the world combined industrial prowess with naval supremacy and efficient colonial administration, securing an empire on which the sun never set.
15th–16th Century (Portugal & Spain): Maritime exploration and colonies.
17th Century (Dutch Republic): Finance and trade (stock exchange, joint-stock companies).
18th–19th Century (British Empire): Industrial revolution, naval power, and colonies.
20th – 21st Century (United States): Corporate capitalism, liberal democracy, and technological innovation.
21st Century (China): Manufacturing scale and state-directed capitalism.
21st Century (future? India?): Digital public goods, democracy, and green growth.
In the twentieth century, the United States crafted yet another model of power. Unlike Britain, it did not seek to administer colonies. Its strength lay in corporate capitalism, technological innovation, and liberal democracy. From Ford’s assembly line to Silicon Valley, from Hollywood films to its universities, American culture and products shaped the global imagination. In the twenty-first century, China pursued a different route again. By turning itself into the world’s factory and lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty, it used manufacturing scale and state-directed capitalism as the foundation of its rise. Today, it challenges the United States not only in trade but also in advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and space.
These trajectories share a lesson: empires rise by cultivating their own advantage, not by copying others.
In 2025, India stands at such a turning point. It is the world’s most populous nation and the fastest-growing large economy, raising the question: Can India become the third global pole alongside the United States and China? Ashley J. Tellis answers candidly: India “will grow undeniably stronger but less able to wield that strength in meaningful ways.” ¹ The gap with China is simply too vast to close by mid-century.
The numbers make this clear. In 2024, the United States had a GDP of about $29 trillion, China roughly $18.7 trillion, and India $3.9 trillion, according to World Bank estimates. Even if India sustains an impressive average growth rate of around six per cent annually, while China slows to about two and a half per cent, the difference remains stark. By 2050, India might reach close to $18 trillion in GDP, but China would still be in the mid-thirties, and the United States near fifty.
(Baseline: World Bank 2024 GDP data; assumptions: China 2.5% growth, India 6%, USA 2%)
Even when one tests different scenarios, the conclusion remains the same. If China slows to as little as one and a half per cent growth while India accelerates to seven, India still does not overtake China by mid-century. At best, the gap narrows; at worst, China remains three times larger. The structural reality is sobering. India will rise, but it will not be China’s equal in absolute economic size by 2050.
And yet, history also tells us that sheer size is not the only measure of power. The Dutch never matched the territorial reach of Spain but created a financial empire. The United States never rivalled Britain in colonies but forged dominance through corporations and innovation. China did not mimic the United States but instead relied on manufacturing scale. The true danger for India would be to fall into the trap of imitation—to try to “out-China China” in manufacturing or “out-America America” in corporate capitalism. These are contests where it begins too far behind.
Yet these advantages coexist with real constraints—manufacturing lag, low R&D expenditure, high import dependence in defence, and rising democratic strains. As Tellis warns, India’s greatest risk is internal erosion: “If India drifts toward illiberalism, it will weaken its claim to being a democratic model.”²
In a timely discussion, Dhruva Jaishankar reinforces this outlook, describing India's trajectory not as one of formal alliance but of partnership:
“India cannot balance China entirely on its own… but it is doing a lot with the U.S., including activities some might describe as quasi-alliance behaviour… intelligence sharing, combined maritime operations… mutual logistics assistance.”³
Jaishankar nevertheless stresses that India remains wary of formal entanglements, preserving strategic autonomy to avoid being marginalised in any U.S.–China condominium.
Equally thoughtful, Nirupama Rao reflects on India’s global brand:
“India’s strength isn’t only in its economy, but in showing that a diverse democracy can work—that’s a rare model in a world filled with illiberal alternatives.”⁴
Her words echo Obama’s during his 2015 visit: “If India, with its immense diversity, can continually affirm its democracy, it is an example for every other country on Earth.”
Instead, India must craft its rise from within its own distinctive strengths and not copy from the Global History.
The first and most obvious advantage is demography. While China and the West age, India’s population will remain youthful well into the mid-century. That youth, however, must be educated, skilled, and employed; otherwise, it becomes a liability rather than a dividend. Closely tied to this is India’s extraordinary success with digital infrastructure. In the last decade, systems such as Aadhaar, UPI, and CoWIN have shown the world that it is possible to deliver large-scale, low-cost digital public goods. These innovations are not just domestic tools but potential exports to other countries, particularly in the Global South.
India’s pluralistic democracy is another asset, albeit one under strain. Its messy but resilient institutions, combined with its cultural exports—Bollywood, cricket, yoga, and cuisine—give it a soft power resonance that China lacks. Its diaspora extends this influence even further. Thirty million Indians abroad occupy positions of leadership in global business and politics, from Silicon Valley CEOs to prime ministers in other countries.
Geography adds to these advantages. The Indian Ocean, through which much of global trade flows, is India’s natural sphere of influence. Securing its waters is as central to India’s long-term strategy as control of the seas was for Britain. In the twenty-first century, green energy presents another opportunity. With abundant solar and wind resources, India could become the global hub for renewable energy, much as the Persian Gulf became the hub for oil in the twentieth century. In space and defence, India has already demonstrated unique capabilities. The Chandrayaan and Mangalyaan missions were completed at a fraction of the cost of Western programs, a sign of India’s frugal innovation. In defence, it is pushing—slowly but surely—towards greater self-reliance.
But India’s path is not without obstacles. Its manufacturing sector lags far behind China’s, limiting its ability to generate exports and jobs at scale. Its research and development expenditure remains below one per cent of GDP, compared to more than two per cent in China. Tariffs and regulatory barriers continue to discourage integration into global supply chains. Its armed forces remain dependent on imported equipment. And most crucially, its democracy is showing signs of strain.
Here, Tellis issues his sharpest warning: “If India drifts toward illiberalism, it will undermine its own most valuable advantage.” The Global South looks to India not just because of its size but because it represents the possibility of a large, diverse democracy succeeding. If that legitimacy is lost, India risks becoming just another big country with great power ambitions but limited appeal.
India’s future, then, lies not in chasing after China’s shadow or America’s example but in forging its own playbook. That playbook must rest on turning its youth into a skilled global workforce, exporting its digital public goods to the Global South, becoming a hub for affordable green technologies, securing the Indian Ocean as its strategic highway, and remaining a democracy, whose diversity is a strength rather than a weakness.
History teaches this lesson: empires don't rise by imitation, but by being true to what elevates them. For India, that is still being written.
Footnotes
Ashley J. Tellis, Foreign Affairs, “What Kind of Great Power Will India Be?”, September/October 2025 issue: “India will grow undeniably stronger but less able to wield that strength in meaningful ways.”
Ashley J. Tellis, Foreign Affairs, interview excerpt.
Dhruva Jaishankar, Foreign Affairs Interview, “The Uncertain Future of U.S. Relations With India,” July 31, 2025.
Nirupama Rao, Foreign Affairs Interview, “The Uncertain Future of U.S. Relations With India,” July 31, 2025.
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